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Abstract 
A sound and complete semantics is given for sequential, depth-first logic programming with 
a version of negation as failure. The semantics is logical in the sense that it is built up only 
from valuation functions (multi-valued logic interpretations in the style of Fitting and Kunen) 
and logically-motivated equivalence relations between formulas. The notion of predicate folding 
and unfolding with respect to a program (Tamaki, Sate, Levi et al.) and the universal notion of 
“disjunctive unfolding” (Andrews) are important elements of this semantics. 
The negation used is the version which returns an error indication whenever it is invoked 
on a non-ground goal. It is theoretically interesting that this form of negation, along with the 
left-to-right processing of depth-first logic programming, can be characterized logically with four- 
valued interpretations over an extended alphabet of terms. The fourth truth value, N, can be read 
operationally as “floundering on negation”. The extension of the alphabet provides the semantics 
with a logical analogue of free variables. This intriguing technique may open the door to the 
characterization of other forms of practical negation, or of other language features involving 
groundness conditions. 
This material was published earlier as a technical report [4] and is the expanded version, 
including proofs, of a paper presented at the 1993 International Logic Programming Symposium 
(ILPS) [5]. 
1. Introduction 
Sometimes it is possible to take a seemingly non-logical feature of a logic program- 
ming system, and give it a more logical interpretation by extending our traditional 
notions of semantics. In [ 1,2] it was shown how this can be done for the depth-first, 
left-to-right strategy of sequential Prolog. In this paper, those results are made more 
abstract, and extended to a system having a form of negation as failure. The main 
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new elements added are a fourth truth value (to go with true, false and undefined) and 
a set of special constants which act as a logical analogue of free variables. 
This paper also contains the clearest description so far of a style of semantics which 
could be called “congruential”, which was latent in the proof-theoretic descriptions of 
[ 1,2] and was developed further in [3]. The general method behind this semantics is 
to characterize a restricted class of query/program pairs with a compositional, logical 
valuation function, and then to characterize wider classes of queries and programs 
with the use of congruences (syntactically compositional equivalence relations) between 
formulas. 
A pleasant feature of congruential semantics is the economy of mathematical notions 
it uses: it is built up almost exclusively from notions of term, formula, truth value, 
valuation, and congruence between formulas. 
1.1. Handling of negation 
The ideal situation in logic 
ative semantics of programs, 
programming would be to have a highly logical declar- 
and a practical operational semantics, with a powerful 
negation, which is sound and complete with respect to it. However, it is generally 
agreed that we must compromise on some of these requirements to stay within the 
logic programming paradigm. The compromise taken here is to use a relatively weak 
negation, but to try to maintain the rest of the ideal. 
The particular form of negation considered in this paper is what could be called 
“insist-on-ground negation as failure”: it computes a goal 1G by the regular negation- 
as-failure (NAP) method only if G is ground, and terminates query processing imme- 
diately with an error indication if G is not ground. This is preferable to the unsound 
negation of most Prologs for some applications, but Naish points out [39] that even 
the slightly more liberal form of NAP used in IC-Prolog gives the error indication 
frequently. More useful is the form of NAP in which the call to 1G is delayed until 
G is ground [22,38]. 
However, it is theoretically interesting that this form of negation can be given 
a logical semantics based on a four-valued logic. The four truth values are T (true), 
F (false), U (undefined), and N (“floundering on negation”, needed to help charac- 
terize the other truth values). They are arranged in the following total order to give 
a semantics to the existential quantifier: 
I 
F 
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The ordering is not on “degree of truth” but rather on “degree of computational pri- 
ority”; so the four truth values do not have the same structure as in, for instance, 
Belnap’s four-valued logic [ 151. 
Assisting in the logical characterization of the negation are an infinite number of 
“special constants”. These constants act as logical stand-ins for unbound variables in the 
truth-functional semantics, allowing a logical interpretation of the groundness condition. 
Essentially, if a query flounders, then the special constants allow for some “ground” 
instance of it to flounder as well. The operational semantics i  extended to take account 
of the special constants for theoretical purposes, but they are not needed in the usual 
query evaluation process. 
The operational semantics within which the negation is situated is sound and com- 
plete with respect o the declarative, and uses the usual top-down, depth-first search 
strategy of most Prolog interpreters. This makes it somewhat more practical for general- 
purpose logic programming than proposals for negation which need a bottom-up and/or 
breadth-first strategy for completeness. Floundering can be avoided in practice by, for 
instance, requiring that variables inside negations be input-mode. However, note that 
the semantics given here is complete for all queries and programs, and thus in particular 
any restricted subset of queries and programs. 
1.2. Unfoldings and congruences 
In some sense, all the big problems in logic programming semantics come from the 
presence of recursive predicate definitions. The approach of this paper to handling this 
aspect of the semantics is based on the following observation: 
If goal G succeeds (fails) with respect o a program P, then there is some 
unfolding of G which is true (false) in the Clark equality theory CET [21]. 
Usually we speak of the unfolding of a program [45], but when we generalize the 
notion of goal to include equalities (interpreted consistent with CET) and connectives, 
we can unfold goals as well. The positive part of the Clark completion [21] of P is 
read as the specification of a fold/unfold congruence Ep between formulas (rendering 
irrelevant its falsehood or inconsistency as a set of formulas). We can thus use Sp 
and the semantics of goals with respect o the empty program to define the semantics 
of goals with respect o P. 
Example. Let P consist of the two clauses “even(O).” and “euen(s(s(x))) c euen(n).” 
Then the positive completion of P, compl(P), is 
euen(y) (--f (y = 0) V 3x(y = s(s(x)) & even(x)) 
Therefore the first unfolding of leven(s(0)) is 
-((s(O) = 0) V 3x(s(O) = s(s(x)) & even(n))) 
which is true even with respect o the empty program. 
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These ideas are closely related to those used by Levi et al. [34,28], who define 
the “unfolding semantics” of a program via the limit of the process of unfolding the 
program. These ideas allow us to sidestep the problem of asymmetry of success and 
failure in the least-model and fixpoint semantics by viewing the process of unfolding 
as central. 
1.3. Organization of this paper 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some basic definitions. 
Section 3 gives the operational semantics which will act as a reference point for the 
declarative semantics. Section 4 gives the declarative semantics, in three parts: the se- 
mantics of a restricted class of goal formulas with respect to the empty program, the 
semantics of general goals with respect to the empty program, and the semantics of 
general goals with respect to general programs. Section 4 also gives proofs of relative 
soundness and completeness of the two semantics. Section 5 discusses various issues, 
such as the logicalness of the semantics and the characterization of variant forms of 
negation. Section 6 discusses this work in the context of previous work, and Section 7 
gives conclusions and suggestions for future work. 
2. Basic definitions 
Definition 2.1. A jirst-order language 9 consists of a countably infinite set 9?(Z) of 
variable names, a finite set 9(Y) of function symbols fi each with an associated arity 
ni > 0, and a set P(Z) of predicate names pi each with an associated arity mj B 0. 
In the sequel we will assume the existence of some fixed first-order language 9 
with equality = as the language of all programs. We will also assume the existence 
of a countably infinite set Y of “special constants”. Terms in 9 and Y are built up 
from the variables and special constants in the usual way with the function symbols. 
We will use x, y as meta-variables standing for variables, p for predicates, and s, t for 
terms, all possibly subscripted. 
In order to express the logical connectives more clearly, we will work with a syn- 
tactic generalization of goals and programs, in the style of Miller et al. [37]. It should 
be clear that this is no loss or gain of power over the usual clausal form. 
Definition 2.2. A goal formula G of a language 9 is a formula built up from the 
following BNF syntax: 
G::=(s=t)(p(tl,..., t,)IG&GIGvGI3xGI-G 
A formula is ordinary if it contains no special constants. 
A clause (dejining p) in a language 9 is a formula of the form p(tl,. . . , tn) + G, 
where G is ordinary, or of the form p(tl, . . .,t,). 
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A program is a finite sequence of clauses. 
We will use G,A,B, C as meta-variables standing for goal formulas, and P for 
programs, all possibly subscripted. 
We will not be concerned so much with the original form of a program as with its 
positive Clark completion [21]. 
Definition 2.3. Let C be a clause in program P. Let cc(C,P) be defined as: 
. 3Y, . . .yn(xl = t1,. . .) x, = t,) & G, if C is of the form p(tl,. . .,t,) + G, and 
. 3Y, . ..YJXi = t1,..., x, = t,), if C is of the form p(tl,...,t,) 
where yi,..., yn are all free variables of C, and xi,. . . , x, are the first n variables not 
appearing in P. 
Let p be a predicate name and P be a program containing clauses defining p. Let 
cd( p, P) be the expression p(xl, . . . , x,,) H cc(C1) V . . . V cc(&), where Cl,. . . , C, is 
the sequence of clauses in P defining p, and xi,. . . , x, are the first n variables not 
appearing in P. 
Then the positive Clark completion of P, compl(P), is the set {cd( pl, P), . . . , cd 
(p,,P)], where pl,..., pk are all the predicates defined in P. 
Note that for simplicity we assume all predicates are defined with the same arity 
in P. Also, while the original Clark completion does not refer to the sequence of clauses 
in P, here we modify the definition slightly to insist that the sequence of clauses in P 
be preserved in the sequence of cc expressions in cd(p, P). 
Definition 2.4. A equivalence relation E is a binary relation which is reflexive 
(A = A), symmetric (if A E B then B E A), and transitive (if A 3 B and B E C then 
A E C). 
A congruence (between goal formulas) is an equivalence relation E such that 
1. If B g B’ and C Z C’, then (B & C) P! (B’ & C’); 
2. If B g B’ and C g C’, then (B V C) 2 (B’ V C’); 
3. If B S B’, then 3xB e 3xB’; and 
4. If B S B’, then 1B E -IB’. 
One important class of congruences is the following. It makes use of the notion 
of predicate folding and unfolding introduced by Tamaki and Sato [45], based on the 
corresponding functional notion of Burstall and Darlington [20]. 
Definition 2.5. The fold/unfold congruence associated with a program P, +, is the 
least congruence such that for every predicate definition p(xi, . . . ,x,) c) G in compl(P), 
we have that 
pth,..., t,) gp G[xl := tl,. . .,x, := t,] 
Informally, A Sp A’ holds if A’ can be obtained from A by any number of fold 
or unfold transformations (including zero). The intersection of any collection of 
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congruences is a congruence, so the intersection of all such congruences is the least 
such congruence. 
3. Operational semantics 
To specify precisely what kind of logic programming system we are talking about, 
I give here a formal operational semantics SPN (Sequential Prolog with Negation) 
for the system. SPN is basically SLD-resolution for our general goals and programs, 
streamlined for the desired left-to-right and negation strategies. 
SPN is actually an abstract interpreter, since the only observable it characterizes is 
which of four general outcomes results from the computation of a goal: 
l T, meaning that the computation returns at least one answer substitution; 
l F, meaning that the computation fails finitely; 
l U, meaning that the computation has floundered upon trying to call a non-existent 
predicate (which is closely related to divergence, as we will see); and 
l N, meaning that the computation has floundered on negation on a non-ground sub- 
goal. 
This form of operational semantics is the most convenient for the purposes of proving 
equivalence with the truth-functional semantics. It omits mention of the returned an- 
swer substitution, and does not characterize the finding of more than one substitution; 
however, it could easily be modified to characterize these observables. 
3.1. SPN derivations as proofs 
To explain computations in SPN, it is perhaps more convenient to look on them first 
as proofs of statements, in analogy with formal mathematical proofs. 
Like a formal proof, a “computation” of SPN is a tree of “judgements”, written root- 
down, with only certain allowed configurations of child nodes (premisses) to parent 
node (conclusion). (The use of formal systems to express operational semantics was 
first studied extensively by Plotkin [41].) The allowed configurations of premisses and 
conclusion are given by proof rules; SPN’s are given in Fig. 1. A particular judgement 
J is considered to be proven if there is a tree, built according to the rules, with J at 
the bottom and only axioms (zero-premiss rules) at the top. 
In SPN, judgements are expressions of the form (0 : cc) 4 0, where 8 is a substitution 
(the current variable binding environment), CI is a sequence of goal formulas (the goal 
stack, or sequence of goals yet to be processed), P is a program (the current program 
under consideration), and CJ is a truth value (the result of the computation). (0 : a) 
is called the closure, in analogy with the corresponding notion in functional language 
interpreters. The current program P is often omitted, where it can be assumed. 
For example, let P be the program consisting of the single clause p(2). The positive 
Clark completion of this program is 
p(x) * x = 2 
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&: 
(e : B,C,a) + o 
(B:B&C,cr)=z.a 
v1: 
(0: B,u) + o 
(O:BvC,a)+-a 
where o is T, U, or N 
=l: 
(efl: a) * 0 
(B:s=t,u)*o 
where fl is an mgu of ae and te 
pl: 
(e:A(tl,...,t”),cr)5-g 
(e : p(tl,. ., t-1, a) % o 
where p(xl, . .,x,,) - A(xl, . .,x,) is 
in compl( P) 
71: 
(t’:B)+T 
(B:-B,cr)*F 
where BB does not contain free variables 
or special constants 
73: 
(B:-B,u)+N 
where BB contains free variables or spe- 
cial constants 
(e : 6) * T 
3: 
(e : B[x := X’], 0) a 0 
(e : 3xB, a) * 0 
where x’ does not appear below the line 
v2: (e : B,a) * F (e : c&a) * 0 
(B:BVC,cr)*a 
=2: 
(ezs=t,o)*F 
where s and t have no unifiers 
p2: 
(e : dtl, . . ..tn).a)Lu 
where p is not defined in cornpI 
-2: 
(t’:B)+F (e:a)ao 
(e : -B,a) * (r 
where BB does not contain free variables 
or special constants 
-74: 
(B:B)*u 
(B:-B,cr)*cr 
where BB does not contain free variables 
or special constants, and v is U or N 
Fig. 1. Operational semantics SPN. Special constants are mentioned to aid proofs of theorems, but do not 
appear in ordinary computations. 
([I := 21 : c) + T 
(0 : (y = 2 v 9 = 3)&q(y)) =+ T 
(0 : 32((2 = 2 v z = 3)&-p(z))) * T 
Fig. 2. A simple-derivation in SPN. 
A proof of the judgement (( ) : 3x((x = 2 V x = 3) & T&C))) =+ T is contained 
in Fig. 2. The computation shows that the query 3x(@ = 2 V x = 3) & -p(x)), 
when computed in the context of the empty substitution ( ), results in the truth value 
T; that is, the operational semantics considers the query to be true. The left and 
right-hand columns show the rules which are being applied to form each step of the 
derivation. 
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Fig. 3. A computation i  SPN, showing direction of computation flow. 
3.2. SPN derivations as computations 
Judgements in SPN can also be 
followed by an interpreter computing 
seen as describing the computation steps 
a list of subgoals. To compute a query G 
relative to program P, we let 0 be the empty substitution and CI be the sequence 
consisting of the single formula G, and we try to find a o such that (( ) : G) $ (T is 
provable. 
In our example, if we were trying to find a 0 such that (( ) : 3x((x = 2 v x = 
3) & -p(x))) + o, we could tell that the rule at the bottom of the computation would 
have to be 3. The form of that rule completely determines the form of the substitution 
and goal stack in its premiss (modulo the unimportant choice of variable name), so we 
can reduce the problem of finding o to that of finding the outcome of ((y = 2 v y = 
3) & -p(y)), and then to that of finding the outcome of y = 2 V y = 3,7p(y). At 
this point, we have a choice of rules (Vl or ~2); but the choice depends only on 
the outcome of (( ) : y = 2, ‘p(y)). Therefore we can reduce the problem to find- 
ing that outcome, knowing that we may have to do another subsidiary computation 
afterwards. 
This general pattern of finding the outcomes to subsidiary computations i followed 
throughout he computation. In essence, we proceed around the entire outline of the 
proof, going up the left side and then down the right side of branches, until we get 
back to the root (see Fig. 3). Of course, not all computations terminate; for those that 
do not, no complete proofs exist, only fragmentary ones whose topmost judgements are 
not axioms. This corresponds to the situation of keeping doing subsidiary computations 
forever, without ever finding their outcomes. 
4. Truth-functional semantics 
In this Section, I describe the semantics which is the main contribution of this 
paper. The semantics uses the two logical notions of valuation and congruence. These 
interact to produce a precise characterization that neither notion alone can 
achieve. 
Consider the notion of valuation (function mapping formulas to truth values). A 
valuation v is a highly logical construct if it can be defined compositionally - for 
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Table 1 
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B C 0) 4C) O&c) 
2==2 2=3 T F F 
2 = 2 v loop(3) 2=3 T F u 
instance, by defining u(B& C) = T only when u(B) = u(C) = T. But with the 
left-to-right behaviour of our operational semantics, it is possible to give a composi- 
tional valuation only with subsets of the set of formulas. For example, assume that 
loop is a predicate which goes into infinite recursion on any argument. If we wanted 
a u such that u(G) accurately reflects the operational outcome of the goal G, u would 
have to have the behaviour shown in Table 1. 
The formulas 2 = 2 and (2 = 2 V loop(3)) have exactly the same truth value 
under this valuation; but when they appear as the left-hand half of a conjunction 
whose right-hand half is 2 = 3, they yield different truth values. Thus a faithful u 
cannot be truly compositional. One way to make u more compositional would be 
to map goals onto denotations that were more complex than just truth values; but 
that would make the semantics less logical and more functional than if we used 
valuations. 
It is also possible to identify certain logical and operational equivalences between for- 
mulas: for instance, whenever we replace any subformula (BI V B2) & C by (B1 & C) V 
(B2 &C), we get the same result, even in left-to-right search. But we cannot build up 
a semantics based on such congruences alone, since we would like to define the 
behaviour of 3xB in the traditional logical fashion, in terms of the behaviour of all its 
instances B[x : = t]. 
As this paper shows, however, if we use an interacting collection of valuations 
and congruences, we can preserve much of the compositionality and logical flavour 
that each construct gives. The approach to the present problem is in three stages. 
In the first, we give a valuation on a subclass of goal formulas which character- 
izes their behaviour with respect to the empty program 0. In the second, we de- 
fine a congruence which relates all other goal formulas to this 
respect to 0. Finally, we show that the fold/unfold congruence 
a program P allows us to characterize the behaviour of all 
to P. 
subclass, still with 
+ associated with 
goals with respect 
4.1. First stage: outer-disjunction queries, empty program 
In this section, we define a subset of the goal formulas called “outer-disjunctive” or
“0” formulas. We then give a valuation function u from 0 formulas to truth values, 
and prove that this characterizes precisely the behaviour of 0 formulas with respect o 
the empty program 0. 
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4.1.1. Definitions 
Definition 4.1 (N and 0 formulas). The sets of N (negated-disjunction) formulas and 
O(outer-disjunction) formulas are defined mutually recursively as follows: 
N ::= (tl = f2) 1 p(t, ,...,t,)IN1&NZ(3xN(lO 
O::=NIO1 v02 
Note that the 0 formulas are the goal formulas in which all interior disjunctions are 
the immediate subformulas of either negations or other disjunctions. The N formulas 
are the 0 formulas whose top-level connective is not a disjunction. 
For the purposes of defining the truth valuation on 0 formulas, it is convenient o 
define an ordering on truth values. 
Definition 4.2. The ordering d f on truth values is defined by F < t U d f T < t N, 
As in previous work on truth-functional semantics [26,33], the truth value of an 
existentially quantified formula 3xB will be the maximum, under this ordering, of the 
values of its instances B[x : = t]. This is reflected in the definition of 21, the valuation 
on 0 formulas. 
Definition 4.3. v, a valuation function mapping round, outer-disjunction (0) formulas 
to truth values, is defined as follows: 
l v(t = t) = T; 
l v(s = t) = F, where s is not identical to t; 
l v(p(t1,...,GI)) = u; 
l v(B&C)= VW if v(B) = T, 
v(B) otherwise; 
l v(BVC)= 
v(C) if v(B) = F, 
v(B) otherwise; 
l u(3xB) = m&({B[x : = t] ( t ground}); 
if B ordinary and u(B) = T, 
if B ordinary and o(B) = U, 
if B ordinary and u(B) = F, 
N otherwise. 
(Recall that a formula is ordinary if it contains no special 
compositional, ogical nature of v, in particular the treatment of 
instances of B. 
constants.) Note the 
3xB in terms of the 
4.1.2. Examples 
The treatment of insist-on-ground negation is perhaps the most subtle aspect of the 
valuation v. The key is the way in which an existential formula is assigned a truth value 
which is the maximum, under the Gt ordering, of the truth values of its instances. An 
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B u(B[x := 21) u(B[x:= 31) v(B[x:= k]) 0(&B) 
x=2 T F F T 
7x=2 F T N N 
X=X T T T T 
-l.X=x F F N N 
x=2&7x=3 T F F T 
x=2cYx=2 F F F F 
x=x&,x=2 F F N N 
Table 3 
B u(B[x:= 2, u(B[x := k, u(B[x:= k, u(=yB) 
y:= 21) y:=,il) y:= k]) 
yx=y F N N N 
x=y&1x=y F F N N 
x=y&x=2&1x=y F F F F 
x=y&x=2&ly=3 T F F T 
existential formula receives an N truth value (that is, u considers the query to flounder 
on negation) if and only if at least one of its instances receives N. 
Consider Table 2. k is a special constant. 
Consider lx = 2 and lx = x. For both of these formulas, one instance returns the 
N sign, which (because of its position at the top of the order of truth values) makes 
the existential closure return N as well. 
Now consider the k (special constant) instance of the formula (x = 2 &TX = 3). 
We still have that u(lk = 3) = N; but v(k = 2) = F, and because of the behaviour of 
v on &, the truth value of the instance is F. Essentially, the early, failing subformula 
“protects” the truth value of the entire formula from being pushed upwards by the N, 
because of the asymmetric treatment of & by u. 
The only time that the truth value of the entire k instance will not be protected 
from an N subformula is when either the variable in question does not participate in 
any equations, or else is unified only with itself or with other uninstantiated variables. 
This is because equations like k = k (a k instance of x = x) receive a T truth 
value, causing v to get its final value from the rest of the formula. Thus we have that 
v(3x(x = x & lx = 2)) = N. 
Note that unification with another, uninstantiated variable also works as we would 
like. The uninstantiated variable still raises the error condition, as it would in the 
operational semantics; however, if the uninstantiated variable or anything it is unified 
with is later instantiated, the error condition is not raised. Here is another, similar table 
(Table 3), where j and k are special constants. 
Readers might want to try writing a short Prolog program to confhrn the truth values 
under v of the examples in this section. 
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4.1.3. Properties 
The operational semantics SPN is sound and complete with respect to the valuation 
v, when the goal is an 0 formula and the program is empty. We will prove this by 
a technique which involves looking only at ground queries. 
There are four technical lemmas we will need before we proceed. I will just state 
them here, and prove them in Appendix A. The statements of the lemmas all have to do 
with “logical” behaviour in SPN computations, such as the behaviour of substitutions 
and conjunctions. First is a lemma that states that we can add irrelevant information 
to the substitution in a computation without affecting the result. 
Lemma 4.4 (Substitution Lemma). Let (0 : a) & CT. Then for every 8’ such that xtI = 
x0’ for every free variable x of CC, (0’ : a) 4 CT. 
Next is a lemma which is at the heart of the approach to the proofs used here. The 
basic result is this. Say a negated-disjunction formula B has a free variable x, and the 
computation of B as a goal results in (T. Then e is exactly the maximum, under the 
Gt ordering, of the outcomes of the closed instances of B. To prove this, we need to 
generalize to many variables so that we can do an inductive proof. 
Lemma 4.5 (Existential Lemma). Let CI be a sequence of negated-disjunction (N) 
formulas, such that (0: a) %- c. Let V be a subset of the free variables of &I. 
DeJne a substitution p as acceptable if p does not assign a value to any variable 
not in V, but gp grounds all variables in V. DeJne a’(p) as the function such that 
(gp : a) 3 CJ’( p). Then: 
EXl. For some acceptable p, o’(p) = o. 
EX2. Zf o = T, then for all acceptable p, o’(p) E {T, U,F}. 
EX3. Zf cr = U, then for all acceptable p, a’(p) E {U,F}. 
EX4. Zf o = F, then for all acceptable p, o’(p) = F. 
Next come two lemmas which will allow us to reason separately about the two con- 
juncts in a conjunction. The first concerns success, and the second, all other outcomes. 
Lemma 4.6 (Conjunction, Left Success). Let a’ be a sequence of negated-disjunction 
(N) formulas, such that (0 : a’) $ T. Then (0 : a’, a) 8 cr ifs there is some 8’ such 
that: 
(1) At the top right corner of the derivation of (0: a’) is the judgement (0’ : E) 8 T; 
and 
(2) (et : a) 8 0. 
Lemma 4.7 (Conjunction, Left Non-Success). Zf (0 : a’) =% o, where ct # T, then for 
all a, (e : a’, a) 3 o. 
Using these lemmas, we can proceed with the proof of characterization. We will 
prove the two directions separately. 
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Theorem 4.8 (Soundness of SPN wrt u). For all ground, outer-disjunction (0) for- 
mulas G, if (( ) : G) 8 CI, then u(G) = (T. 
Proof. By induction on the size of G. Cases are on the form of G. 
l Case B & C: There are two subcases. 
If (( ) : B)+ T, then by the Conjunction LeR Success lemma, there is some 6’ such 
that (6)’ :C) + 0. But then, since C is ground and the choice of substitution cannot affect 
its outcome, we also have that (( ) : C) =S (r. By the induction hypothesis, therefore, 
u(B) = T and u(C) = a; but then by the definition of u, u(B&C) = o. 
If (( ) : B) + (T, where 0 # T, then by the Conjunction Left Non-Success lemma, 
(( ): B,C) + G as well. By the induction hypothesis, u(B) = o; but by the definition 
of u, u(B& C) = (r as well. 
l Case 3xB: Because we have assumed that G is outer-disjunctive, this G must be 
a negated-disjunction (N) formula. We can therefore apply the Existential emma. 
We apply the Existential emma to the computation (( ) : B) + 0, with the set Y 
of variables set to just {x}. (For simplicity, we ignore the renaming of the variable, 
which we can see is not necessary in this case.) By clause (1) of the lemma, there 
must be a t such that ([x : = t] : B) + 0, i.e. that (( ) : B[x : = t])s- o. 
Furthermore, by clauses (2)-(4) of the lemma, all t are such that when (( ) : B[x : = 
t]) + o’, CT’ Gt 6. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, there is some t such that 
u(B[x : = t]) = cr, and for all t, u(B[x : = t]) Gt CT. That is, rr is the maximum, under 
Gr, of the truth values of all the instances of B. By the definition of u, u(3xB) = 0. 
l Case B V C: If (( ) : B) + F and (( ): C) + (T, then by the induction hypothesis, 
u(B) = F and u(C) = o; but then by the definition of u, u(B V C) = cr. 
Otherwise, (( ) : B)+-a and (r # F; but then by the induction hypothesis, u(B) = 6, 
and by the definition of u, u(B V C) = 0. 
l Case s = t: Since G is ground, (( ) : G) + cr only when s is identical to t and (r = T, 
or when s and t are non-identical and 0 = F. u(G) = a in both these cases. 
0 Case p(ti , . . . , t,): The computation of all predicate calls always results in U with 
respect o the empty program, and u(G) = U. 
l Case 1B: Subcases are on the form and behaviour of B. 
- If B contains special constants, then (( ) : lB)=sN and u(lB) = N. 
- If B is ordinary and (( ) : B) =+ T, then (( ) : 7 B) =+ F. But by the induction 
hypothesis, u(B) = T, and therefore u(-B) = F. 
- If B is ordinary and (( ) : B) + F, then (( ) : 1 B) + T, by one use of the 
E rule; but by the induction hypothesis, u(B) = F and u(lB) = T. 
- Finally, if B is ordinary and (( ) : B) + c where D E {U, N}, then (( ) : ‘B) + c 
as well; but by the induction hypothesis, u(B) = o’, so by the definition of u, 
u(lB) = rr as well. 0 
Theorem 4.9 (Completeness of SPN wrt u). For all ground, outer-disjunction G, if 
u(G) = 0, then (( ) : G) =$ 0. 
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Proof. By induction on the size of G. Cases are on the form of G. 
l Case B&C: There are two subcases. If u(B) = T and u(C) = CJ, then by the 
induction hypothesis, (( ) : B) =s- T and (( ) : C) + 0. Applying the Conjunction 
Left Success lemma, we see that if (( ) : B, C) + (T’, then there must be a 8’ such 
that (0’ : C) + cr’; but since C is ground, the choice of substution does not affect 
the outcome of its computation. Therefore g’ = (T, and by an application of the 
& rule, (( ):B&C)+a. 
If u(B) = (T # T, then by the induction hypothesis, (( ) : B) + (r. By the Conjunction 
Left Non-Success lemma, therefore, (( ) : B, C) + o; but then by an application of the 
& rule, (( ):B&C)+o. 
l Case 3xB: By the definition of V, we know that there must be at least one t such 
that v(B[x: = t]) = o; we also know that all t are such that u(B[x: = t])Gt CI. 
So by the induction hypothesis, for some t, ([x : = t] : B) + o; and for all t, when 
([x:= t]:B)+o’, d<rcr. 
Now let (( ) : 3xB) + d’, so that (( ) : B) + a”. If it were the case that CJ” >, o, then 
by clause (1) of the Existential Lemma, there would be a t such that ([x : = t] : B) + 
0’ > f CT, which is not the case. If it were the case that rr” < f CT, then by clauses (2-4) 
of the Existential Lemma, all t would be such that ([x : = t] : B) =$d -cl 0, which is 
not the case. Therefore rr” = a; i.e., (( ) : 3xB)+ (T. 
Case B V C: If u(B) = F and o(C) = 0, then by the induction hypothesis, (( ) : B) 
+ F and (( ) : C) + (r. But then by rule V2, (( ) : B V C) + cr. Otherwise, u(B) = c~ # 
F; by the induction hypothesis, (( ) : B) + (T, and by rule Vl, (( ) : B V C) =s o. 
Case s = t: Recall that s and t must be closed. If s and t are identical, then n = T; 
but then they clearly unify, so (( ) : s = t) + T by one application of rule = 1 and one 
application of rule E. Otherwise, cr = F, s and t do not unify, and (( ): s = t)+ F 
by one application of rule =2. 
Case p(tl , . . . , t,) : CJ = U, and with respect to the empty program, (( ) : p(tl,. . . , t,)) 
=su. 
Case TB: Subcases are on the form of B and value of ~(1 B). 
- If B contains special constants, (( ) : 7 B) +N and ~(7 B) = N. 
- If B is ordinary and u(lB) = N, T, U, or F, then u(B) = N, F, II, or T, 
respectively; therefore, by the induction hypothesis, ((( ) : B) + N, F, U, or T 
respectively; therefore, by the 1 rules, ((( ) : TB)+ N, T, U, or F, respectively. 
0 
The complete result is the following. 
Corollary 4.10 (Characterization, u). For all ground, outer-disjunction G, u(G) = o 
if (( ) : G) %- CT. 
Proof. From the previous two theorems. 0 
So the 0 subset of the queries, computed with respect to the empty program, 
can be given a straightforward, compositional characterization even in the left-to-right 
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interpreter suggested by SPN. Applying u directly to general goal formulas would 
not work, however, essentially because disjunctions have a compositional semantics 
only when they are at the top level of a query. Consider, as a counterexample, the 
query 
!tx((x =xVp( )) & 2 = 3 
If we applied zi to general goal formulas and not just 0 formulas, it would yield 
F on this query (every instance of the left-hand conjunct returns T, and the right- 
hand conjunct returns F). However, in fact, this query returns U when computed 
with respect to the empty program. Essentially, v does not take account of 
backtracking. 
4.2. Second stage: general queries, empty program 
For the next stage, we define a congruence gdU on general goal (G) formulas, and 
show that congruent goals have the same outcome with respect to 8. We then show 
that every goal formula is r&-congruent to an 0 formula, and define the seman- 
tics of G formulas with respect to 8 accordingly. Ed,, is just the congruence induced 
by the disjunctive unfolding operation of [2]. 
4.2.1. The disjunctive unfolding congruence 
The disjunctive unfolding congruence is an equivalence relation between formulas 
which is intended to relate pairs of formulas only if they have the same operational 
outcome. 
Deli&ion 4.11. z&,, the disjunctive unfolding congruence between formulas, is the 
least congruence such that 
. (B1 VBZ)&C~d,(B~&C)V(B2&C); 
l B&(C~VCZ) !%du (B&C1)V(B&C2), when B is a negated-disjunction (N) formula; 
. 3x(B1 V B2) Ed,, (3xBl) V (3xB2). 
Note that some congruences that seem reasonable, such as the De Morgan law 
1 (B V C) g (1B) & (-C), do not preserve operational outcome: for instance, if B is 
true and C has a free variable, then 7 (B V C) flounders but (1 B) & (-C) fails. The 
disjunctive unfolding congruence, however, does preserve operational outcome, as we 
will see later. 
To prove that the disjunctive unfolding congruence preserves operational outcome, it 
is convenient to define a relation which holds between formulas which are only “one 
step apart” in the congruence. 
Definition 4.12. G Ddu G’, in words “G’ is a disjunctive l-unfolding of G”, if G’ is 
just G with either: 
l a subformula of the form (BI V B2) &C replaced by (BI &C) V (B2 &C); or 
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l a subformula of the form B&(Ci v CZ), where B is a negated-disjunction (N) 
formula, replaced by (B&Cl) V (B&C2); or 
l a subformula of the form 3x(Bi V B2) replaced by (3xBi) V (3xB2). 
Lemma 4.13. +$,, is the reflexive-symmetric-transitive closure of the D&, relation. In 
other words, G Ed,, G’ ifs G’ can be obtained from G by 0 or more Ddu steps or their 
inverses. 
Proof. Straightforward from the definitions of Ed,, and Dd,,. 0 
Now for the result on operational equivalence. The proof is a long case analysis, 
but is straightforward. 
Theorem 4.14 (Operational equivalence of Ed,, formulae). Ed,, preserves operational 
outcome on goal stacks; that is, if (0 : Gi,. . . , G,) 4 d for some n 2 1, and (0 : G’,, . . . , 
G~)$oa’,andGi~d,G~forl<i<n,thena’=o. 
Proof. The Gi formulas can be obtained from the Gi formulas by zero or more Dd,, 
steps or their inverses. The proof is by induction on the total number of Ddu steps used. 
The base case, 0, is trivial. For the inductive case, it suffices to prove the result when 
only one Dd,, step has been performed; the rest follows by the induction hypothesis. 
Thus we will prove the result when the two goal stacks differ by only one Ddu step. 
We will do this by induction on the size of the first computation. 
Again the base case (1 judgement in the computation) is easy: the rule is either 
=2 or 13, and neither is affected by the change from Gi to G’, . There are two main 
subcases to the inductive case. If the top-level connective of Gi is unaffected by the 
change to Gi, then the result follows directly from the induction hypothesis. Other- 
wise, we have sub-subcases on how the top-level connective of Gi was transformed 
by Ddu. 
Case 1. Gi and G’, are (Bi vB~) & C and (Bi & C)V(B~ &C), collectively. Schemat- 
ically, we have one of the following two situations: 
(a) if (e:Bi,C,a)*F: 
(e:Bl,C,cr)*F (8:B2,C,Ol)+cr 
(8:Bl v B~,C,cc)+a 
(e:(Bi vB2)&C,a)+a 
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(b) if (O:Br,C,a)+-a, where rr # F: 
(O:B1,C,a)+a (tI:B,,d,cc)~a’ 
(8:Bi vB2,C,a)+o (8:Br &C,a)+a’ 
(O:(Br vB2)&C,a)+-o (O:(B1&C)v(B2&C),cr)+a 
In either situation, the closures at the top of the first computations are exactly the same 
as those at the top of the second; therefore o = rr’. 
Case 2. Gr and Cl, are collectively B & (Cr V C2) and (B & Cr ) V (B & Ca), where 
is an N formula. There are several subcases. 
(0 : B) + T, and (0 : B, Cl, a) + F. In this case we know from the Conjunction Left 
Success lemma that there is a 8’ such that (0’ : Cl V C2, a) + o, but also from another 
application of that lemma that (0’ : Cl, a) + F. Thus (e’ : C2, a) + d, and we have 
the following two computations: 
(e’:C1,a)+F (e’:C$,a)+a 
(ewl VCz,a)*o 
(8:B,Cl VCz,a)*o 
(d:B&(C1 VC2),a)*a 
(e’:C1,a)+-F 
(e:B,C1,a)+F (O:B,C2,a)+o’ 
(fl:B&C1,a)+F (O:B&C2,a)+o’ 
(O:(B&Cr) v (B&C2),a)+d 
Because the form of the closures at the top of each computation is the same, u = o’. 
(8:B) + T, and (O:B,Cr,a) + a”, where g” # F. Again, we know from the 
Conjunction Left Success lemma that there is a 8’ such that (6’ : Cl V C2, a) + 
CT, but also that (0’ : Cl, a) + a”. Thus 0” = 0, and we have the following two 
computations: 
(et : Cl,a) =+ 0 (et : Cl,a) + 0’ 
(e9C,VC,,a)=+-cr 
(e : B,C,,a) + d 
(O:B,CrVC2,a)*a (O:B&Cr,a)=+o’ 
(8:B&(C1VC2),a)+o (8:(B&C1)v(B&C2),tl)+d 
Because the form of the closures at the top of each computation is the same, g = 0’. 
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(0 : B) 3 F. By three applications of the Conjunction Left Non-Success lemma, we 
know that (0 : B,Ci V &,a) + F, (0 : B,Cl, a) =S F, and (0 : B,Cz,a) 3 F. Thus 
we have the following two computations: 
(0 : B,Ci,a) + I; (8 : B,Cz,a) + F 
(6 : B,Ci V Cz,a) + F (0 : B&Cl,a) +-F (0 : B&Cz,a) =+ F 
(tY:B&(C1 VC,),a)*F (0 : (B&Ci)V (B&Cz),a) +-F 
Clearly 0 = 0’ = E;. 
(e : B) * a”, where 0” +Z {T,F}. From two applications of the Conjunction Left 
Non-Success lemma, we know that (0 : B, Cl v Cz, a) =s d’ and (0 : B, Cl, a) + a”. 
Thus we have the following two computations: 
(8 : B,Ci,a) + (T’ 
(0 : B,Ci v C&a) + D (6’ : B&Cl,a) + c# 
(e : B&(C1 v C,),a) =+ 0 (0 : (B&Cl) V (B&CZ),a) + 0’ 
Clearly, 0 = fs’ = a”. 
Case 3. G1 and G{ are 3x(Bt VB2) and (3xBi)v@xBz), collectively. If (6’ : 3x61, a) 
+ F, then we have the following two computations: 
(0 : Bl[x := x’],a) + F (8 : B2[x := x’],a) =F- 0 
(0 : (B1 v B2)[x := x’],a) + c 
(0 : 3x(B, v B2), a) + G 
(0 : BJx := ~‘],a) =+ F (e : B2[x := x’],a) + d 
(0 : 3xBi,a) + F (8 : 3xB2,a) * 6’ 
(0 : (3xBi) v (3xB2),a) + 0’ 
Otherwise, (0 : 3xBi, a) + 0 # F and we have the following two computations: 
(0 : B~[x := ~'],a) =s- 0 (0 : Bl[x := x’],a) + 0 
(8 : (B1 v B2)[x := x’],a) + Q (0 : 3xBi,a) =+ c 
(0 : 3x(B1 v B2), a) + Q (6 1 (3X&) v (3XB2),ff) + 0 
In either case, because the form of the closures at the top of each computation is 
the same, cr = (T’. Cl 
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So g&, preserves operational outcome with respect to the empty program. Now we 
show that every G formula is related to at least one 0 formula. There is in fact a 
simple algorithm to produce a g&congruent 0 formula from any G formula. 
Definition 4.15. G’ is the key subformula [l] of a goal formula G if it is the leftmost 
disjunction in G which is an immediate subformula of a conjunction ( & ) or existential 
(3) subformula. 
O(G), the 0 form of G, is formed from G by the following algorithm: 
1. Set Go to G, and i to 0. 
2. While Gi has a key subformula: 
(a) Set Gi+i to Gi with a Ddu operation applied to the & or 3 subforrnula enclosing 
its key subformula. 
(b) Set i to i+ 1. 
3. Return Gi. 
Theorem 4.16 (Termination of 0 form). The 0 form algorithm always terminates, 
with O(G) being an 0 formula. 
Proof. If G has a key subformula B V C, we will always be able to apply a Dd,, 
operation to its key subformula. (This is the case even if B V C is the right-hand 
conjunct of a conjunction, since the left-hand conjunct must be an N formula.) Each 
repetition of the while loop, however, increases the number of nodes in the tree of 
the formula, but not the height or branching factor of the tree. Since trees with fixed 
height and branching factor have bounded size, the process must terminate. The result 
will be a formula with no disjunctions which are immediate subformulas of & or 3 
subformulas; in other words, an 0 formula. q 
The equivalence class [G] of a formula G under gdU therefore consists of formulas 
which are closely related to each other syntactically, and which all have the same 
operational outcome. Moreover, the last theorem shows that at least one formula in 
[G] is an 0 formula. Since we know that u is a faithful valuation on 0 formulas, we 
know that we can get the operational outcome of any formula in [G] by applying v to 
the 0 formula in [G]. 
4.2.2. The valuation on G 
In this section, we define the valuation v’ on the set G of general goal formulas. 
This valuation is defined in terms of u and %d,,, and is faithful to operational outcome 
for all goals with respect to the empty program. 
Definition 4.17. u’, a valuation function mapping G formulas to truth values, is the 
unique total function such that: 
l v’(G) = u(G) if G is an 0 formula; and 
l v’(G) = u’(G’) if G ?+u G’. 
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The fact that such a V’ exists and is unique comes from the observations at the end 
of the last section. 
Now we can show that v’ precisely characterizes the outcome of general goals with 
respect to 0. This is the main result for v’. 
Theorem 4.18 (Characterization, u’). For aZZ ground goals G, (( ) : G) =% c ifl u’(G) 
= O. 
Proof. O(G) is disjunctive-unfolding-congruent to G. By the fact that gdU preserves 
operational outcome, (( ) : G) + c iff (( ) : O(G)) + 0. By the Characterization Theo- 
rem for 0, this happens iff u(O(G)) = a; but by the definition of v’, this is true iff u’(G) 
= 0. 0 
Could we have given a compositional definition for v’ which did not involve the 
two-stage construction with u and %. 3 It may be possible given a different set of truth 
values (for instance, one in which a distinction is made between successml formulas 
that strongly terminate and those that do not), but it seems clear that with the current set 
of truth values, there is no one-stage, compositional valuation faithful to the behaviour 
of queries. 
4.2.3. Examples 
Example 1. Consider a query of the form 
(Bi V B2)&(C1 v C2) 
where B1, B2, Cl, C2 are all N formulas. This query is ” du-congruent to 
(Bi & (Cl v C2)) v 032 & (Cl v C2)) 
but not to 
C-4 > 
(A2) 
((Bl VB2)&Cl)V(@l VB2)&C2) 643 > 
because (B1 v B2) is not an N formula. Now, since Bi and B2 are N formulas, (AZ) 
is g&,-congruent to 
(B~&C~)V(B~&CZ)V(B~&C~)V(B~&C~) (A4) 
which is an 0 formula; therefore u’(Ai) = v(b). 
Note that the definition of Ed,, contains a side-condition that prevents (A3) from 
being congruent to (Al). This is necessary for the preservation of operational outcome. 
For example, (As) is $,-congruent to 
(B~&CI)V(BZ&CI)V(B~&C~)V(B~&C~) (AS) 
Thus the outcomes of (Al), (AZ) and (&) are always the same (if Bi and BZ are 
N formulas), and the outcomes of (As) and (AS) are the same. But (&) and (AS) 
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cannot always have the same outcome, because the middle two disjuncts of (&) are 
the reverse of those of (AS). For instance, the query 
(true &false) V (true & true) V (loop( ) &false) V (Zoop( ) & true) 
succeeds; but if loop( ) diverges, the query 
(true &false) V (loop( ) &false) V (true & true) V (Zoop( ) & true) 
diverges. 
The side-condition is necessary, therefore, to ensure that the order of disjuncts in 
the congruent 0 formula reflects the order in which disjuncts will be processed in the 
computation. By the characterization theorem, we have v’(Ar ) = u’(Az) = v’(4) = 
v(L) and u’(A3) = u’(As) = v(As), but since & yd,, As, it is not necessarily the case 
that v(h) = v(As). 
Example 2. Consider the formula 
M6) 
This formula is Zd,-congruent to both 
WP(x)&~3Y(k7@> Y)& P(Y)) v (st(r,x)& P(Y))) (A71 
and 
3x(P(x)&l(3Y(gt(x,Y)& P(Y)) v 3Y(c8(YP)& P(Y)))) (As) 
The latter formula is an 0 formula, since its disjunction is directly within a negation. 
Therefore v’(Ag) = v’(A7) = v’(As) = v(As). 
4.3. Final stage: general queries, general programs 
The last stage of the truth-functional semantics defines the fully general valuation 
function up associated with a program P. up is defined in terms of v’ and the fold/unfold 
congruence gp (Definition 2.5) associated with P. v’ was an extension of v via g&,; 
in a similar, but not identical, manner, up is an extension of v’ via Ep. 
4.3.1. The fold/unfold congruence 
Recall the definition of +. 
Definition 4.19. The fold/unfold congruence associated with a program P, S’p, is the 
least congruence such that for every predicate definition p(xl, . . . , x,) w G in compl(P), 
we have that 
p(t1,..., t,) Ep G[xl := tl,...,x, := tn] 
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ZP has the property of preserving operational outcome with respect to program P, 
as NdU does with respect to the empty program. To prove this, it will again be con- 
venient to define a relation which relates goals which are “one step apart” in the gp 
congruence. 
Definition 4.20. Let P be a program. G bp G’, in words “G’ is a P-l-unfolding of G”, 
if G’ is just G with a subformula of the form p(tl,. . .,t,) replaced by A[xl := 
t1,..., x, := t,], where the definition p(xl, . . . ,x,) ct A is in compl(P). 
Lemma 4.21. %p is the reflexive-symmetric-transitive closure of the bp relation. In 
other words, G gp G’ ifs G’ can be obtained from G by 0 or more bp steps or their 
inverses. 
Proof. Straightforward from the definitions of Sp and bp. 0 
Theorem 4.22. gp preserves operational outcome with respect to P; that is, if(6 : Gl, 
. . . . G,) 3 6, for nB1, and (0 : G’, ,... ,GL) 4 o’, and Gi CZ’~ G[ for lfi<n, then 
0’ = Cr. 
Proof. The Gf formulas can be obtained from the Gi formulas by zero or more bp 
steps or their inverses. The proof is by induction on the total number of DP steps used. 
The base case, 0, is trivial. For the inductive case, it suffices to prove the result when 
only one DP step has been performed; the rest follows by the induction hypothesis. 
Thus we will prove the result when the two goal stacks differ by only one bp step. 
We will do this by induction on the size of the first computation. 
Again, the base case (1 judgement in the computation) is easy: the rule is either 
=2 or -3, and neither is affected by the change. There are two main subcases to 
the inductive case. If neither Gi or G’, is a predicate call, then the change does 
not affect the top-level connective, and the result follows directly from the induction 
hypothesis. Otherwise, Gt and G’, are collectively p(tl,. . . , tn) and A[xl := tl,. . .,x, := 
t,]. Clearly, because of the computation step 
(6’ : A[xl := tl,. . . ,x, :== t,], a) + CT 
(0 : Pctl ,...,&I),~) * rJ 
the two computations have identical results. 0 
We must now prove that every goal G has a P-unfolding G’ which has the same 
outcome with respect to the empty program that G does with respect to P. We prove 
a generalization of this, for induction purposes. 
Theorem 4.23 (P-congruent form theorem). Let (0 : GI,. . . ,G,) 4 o. Then there 
exist G’,,..., GL such that Gi gp G; for all ldibn, and (0: G’,,...,GL) =% o. 
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Fig. 4. The Hasse diagram of the “information” or “definedness” ordering <k. 
Proof. By induction on the size of the first computation. In the base case (1 judgement 
in computation), Gi = Gi for all 1 <i <n, since the rule used must have been =2, p2, 
-3, or E, and using the empty program instead of P does not affect the result. For the 
induction case, subcases are on the form of the last rule used. 
All subcases follow immediately from the induction hypothesis except for pl. In that 
subcase, Gi is some p(ti, . . . , t,). Schematically, we have: 
(b) (0 : A(tl,. ..,t,,),Gz ,..., G,) + CJ -% (0 : G;,G; ,..., GA) + cr (c) 
(a) (0: p(tl,...,t,),G2,...,G,) + CJ 
By assumption, we have (a) and (b). By the induction hypothesis, there are G’, , . . . , GA 
such that (c). But since p(ti,. . . , t,) Ep A(tl ,. . ., t,), and A(tl,. . . , t,) Sp G’,, certainly 
p(t1,..., t,) Sp Gi (by the transitivity of g!p). So G[ +J Gi for all 1 <i d n, and the 
result holds. 0 
The consequences here are slightly different than with g&,. The equivalence class 
[G] of G under !Zp contains formulas which all have the same outcome w.r.t. P. Also, 
it is always the case that there is one formula G’ in [G] for which v’(G’) yields that 
outcome. However, it is not totally decidable what the formula is, because the search 
for it may be non-terminating. 
4.3.2. The valuation VP 
Finally, we reach the valuation VP associated with P. This can be seen as the 
“denotation” of a program in this style of semantics. 
First, we define another ordering on the truth values, analogous to the “information” 
or “definedness” ordering of [ 151. It orders truth values based on how much information 
is contained in them. 
D&&Ion 4.24. The ordering <k between truth values is delined by: U <kn! u 6 kT, 
U dkF (see Fig. 4). 
VP is defined in terms of v’, Ep, and <k. 
Definition 4.25. up, a valuation function for program P mapping ground goal formulas 
to truth values, is defined as: 
VP(G) = maq({V’(G’) 1G 2~ G’)) 
where mak(S) is the maximum over <k of the truth values in the set s. 
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up is everywhere defined because of the properties of v’ and Ep. We have the 
following lemma: 
Lemma 4.26. Zf G’ gp G”, and (( ) : G’) 3 0’ # U, and (( ) : G”) =% B” # U, then 
o’ = a”. 
Proof. (( ) : G’) & a’ as well, since the definitions in P can have no effect on the 
outcome. Similarly, (( ) : G”) 4 a”. But then a’ = a”, since Sp preserves operational 
outcome. q 
up precisely characterizes the outcome of all ground goals, not just with respect 
to the empty program now, but with respect to P. The following theorem is the 
culmination of all our work, and shows that up can be taken as the denotation 
of P. 
Theorem 4.27 (Characterization, up). For all ground goals G and programs P: 
(l)Zf(():G)&a, then vp(G)=a. 
(2) Zf there is no a such that (( ) : G) 4 a, then up(G) = U. 
Proof. (1) If (( ) : G) & a, then (by the P-congruent form theorem) there must be 
some G’ gp G such that (( ) : G’) 3 a. But then by the lemma, no other G” gp G can 
have any outcome other than U or a. Now, v’(G’) must be a, by the characterization 
theorem for v’; so the definedness maximum, over all G’ gp G, of v’(G’) must be a. 
Thus up(G) = a. 
(2) If there is no such a, then there can be no G’ Np G such that (( ) : G’) =$ a E 
{N, T, F}; because otherwise we would certainly have that (( ) : G’) 3 a, and thus 
that (( ) : G) 3 a. Thus the definedness maximum, over all G’ Ep G, of u’(G’) must 
be U. 0 
So up is faithful to the operational outcome of queries evaluated under P. Note 
that if we just know that up(G) = U, we cannot tell whether G would diverge, or 
terminate returning U. However, if G and P contain no references to predicates not 
defined in P, the situation is more clear. Under that reasonable assumption, up(G) = 
U iff G diverges, and up(G) E {N, T,F} iff G terminates returning that truth 
value. 
Note that although the result refers only to ground goals, this is no real limitation. 
Whenever we give a goal to a Prolog system, we intend that any free variables in it 
be implicitly existentially quantified. It is a simple corollary that 
For all goals G and programs P: 
(1) If (( ) : G) & a, then vp(3[G]) = a. 
(2) If there is no a such that (( ) : G) & a, then vp(3[G]) = U. 
.I Andrewsl Theoretical Computer Science 184 (1997) 105-143 129 
4.3.3. Examples 
Example 1. Consider the example from the Introduction: 
even(O). 
euen(s(s(n))) + even(x). 
The positive Clark completion of P, compl(P), is: 
even(y) - (y = 0) V 3(y = s(s(x)) & even(x)) 
Now consider the query leuen(s(0)). We have that u’(euen(s(0))) = U, since u’(G) = 
U for all predicate calls G; thus u’(leuen(s(0))) = U as well. However, 
Teven(s(0))) Zp ~(s(0) = 0 V 3x(s(O) = s@(x)) & even(x))) 
which is an 0 formula; and since u(s(0) = 0) = u(s(0) = s(s(t))) = F for all t, we 
have that 
u'(~(s(0) = 0 v 3+(O) = s(s(x)) 8z euen(x)))) = F 
Thus up(Teuen(s(0))) = F. 
Example 2. Consider the program 
mem (x, [xlxs]). 
mem(x, [ylxs]) + mem(x,xs). 
The positive Clark completion of P is 
mem(x, 1) - 3xs(l = [xlxs]) V 3y3xs(l = [ylxs] & mem(x,xs)) 
Now consider the query mem(b, [al[b([ I]]). We have that 
meNby [alPl[ Ill) 
E’P ~4blPl[ 111 =W~IN 
~_EW[44[ 111 =[~lx~l&memQw)) 
EP ~xNalPl[ 111 =WIW 
3y3xs([a([bl[ I]] = [ylxs] &(3xs’(xs = [blxs’])V 
3y3xs’(xs = [ylxs’] & mem(b,xs’))) 
%dU ~-=U4?4[ 111 =[bI-=l>V 
!lytlxs([aJ[bl[ I]] = [ylxs] & 3xs’(xs = [blxs’]))V 
3yZlxs([al[bl[ I]] = [ylxs] dz 3y3xs’(xs = [y(xs’] &mem(b,xs’))) 
The last formula above is an 0 formula. But 
n(3=([al[bl[ 111 =Plxsl)) = F, and 
u@y3xs([al[b([ I]] = [ylxs] &3xs’(xs = [blxs’]))) = T 
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by virtue of the fact that when we choose [y := a,xs := [bl[ I]], 
~([4Vl[ 111 =[44[ 111~3~4[~l[ 11 = wm = 7,. 
Therefore vp(mem(b, [al[bl[ I]])) = T. 
Example 3. Consider the Clark-Andreka-Nemeti paradoxical program [lo] 
inj%st([ylys]) + inj%st(ys). 
Its positive Clark completion is 
inJEist(x) H 3y3ys(x = [ylys] & inJist(ys)) 
Consider the query Zlz(i~~ist(z)). Let Gk be the result of doing k unfoldings of 
i@&(z). We have that v(Gk[z := t]) = U for all t which are lists of length > k, but 
u(Gk[z := t]) = F for all other t. Now because F<,U, we have that v@z(Gk)) = U. 
This holds for all k. But there is therefore no unfolding G of 3(inJlist(z)) such that 
v(G) is anything other than U, so up(Zlz(inJist(z))) = U, as desired. 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Recursive enumerability 
The valuation up, the denotation of P, is the only valuation in this paper which is not 
a total recursive function. v is recursively defined on the structure of its argument, and 
v’ can be characterized as just v applied to the (computable) 0 form of its argument. 
Another way of seeing that v and v’ are total recursive is that they are simply the 
outcomes of the computation process defined by SPN w.r.t. the empty program, which 
always terminates because it does not expand predicate calls. 
up, on the other hand, is a total function, but not recursive; to find whether there is 
a G’ such that G Ep G’ and v’(G’) # U involves a potentially infinite search. This is 
to be expected, of course: finding a total recursive up which soundly and completely 
characterized SPN computations would be equivalent to solving the halting problem. 
The fact that the earlier stages v and v’ are total recursive is an appealing feature of 
this congruential semantics, since it suggests we have “factored out” the non-recursively 
enumerable elements into the last stage. 
5.2. Logicalness of characterization 
The three-stage characterization given here inherits its logicalness from the congru- 
ences and valuations used in its construction. It would be better if we could collapse 
some of the stages together, for instance by internalizing the predicate unfolding stage 
within the valuation; but this seems impossible to do cleanly, in part because of the 
Clark-Andreka-Nemeti anomaly. 
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The logical flavour of the congruences comes from the following fact: 
Proposition 5.1. Zf G Ep G’ or G Ed,, G’, then compl(P) k (G * G’). 
The proposition is true because the congruences only ever replace subformulae by 
subformulae which are equivalent in the models of compl(P). Thus, looking at a goal 
for the moment as a first-order formula, by unfolding predicates and taking the dis- 
junctive unfolding of the resulting formula, we are simply tranforming the goal into 
an equivalent formula. 
After unfolding predicates and disjunctions, we are applying a non-standard val- 
uation function u to the result. If we replaced u by the standard first-order three- 
valued intuitionistic valuation (e.g. based on Kripke’s theory of truth [32]), we would 
get a up which simply reflected the truth of the formula in models of the posi- 
tive completion of P. However, although our u is non-standard, it is compositional, 
and the valuation of an existential formula is the truth maximum of the valuations 
of all its instances. Indeed, ignoring the left-to-right treatment of the binary con- 
nectives and the special treatment of special constants, u is identical to the stan- 
dard valuation with respect to the least model of the Clark Equality Theory 
(CET [21]). 
Finally, the definition of up(G) in terms of u’(G), <k, and Zp is logical in the sense 
that we are finding the “most defined” truth value of a certain set of formulae equivalent 
to the original formula, where our notion of definedness follows standard treatments in 
multi-valued logic. It would be better if we could define up(G) in a way that was fully 
compositional with respect to the structure of G; but several counterexamples (such as 
the one given at the start of Section 4) suggest that this is not possible. 
In particular, let P once again be the Clark-Andreka-Nemeti paradoxical program 
VOI 
The least model of this program contains no instance of i@st(y), so 3~(inJlist(~.~)) 
is not entailed by it; and yet no top-down interpreter can deduce that the query 
i@st(~) should fail, although top-down interpreters are complete for success. 
(Analogous problems arise with the “gap” between Tp 1 o and the least fixpoint 
of Tp 1 in fixpoint semantics and Kripke-Kleene semantics [26].) So if we defined 
up(3v(inJlist(~~))) in a fully compositional way, as the truth maximum (max,) of the 
set {up(injM(t))(t is a ground term}, we would erroneously conclude that the query 
failed. 
In contrast, i@&(v) is given the operationally correct “undefined” truth value in 
the congruential semantics in this paper, since there is no unfolding of it with a de- 
fined truth value. It seems that a correct valuation function for depth-first Prolog must 
go through some kind of unfolding stage before applying a compositional valuation 
function. 
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5.3. Other negation strategies 
Many practical programs can be computed without floundering in the operational 
semantics described here, since negated atoms in clauses often correspond to tests 
done on ground terms. However, it would still be preferable to be able to characterize 
other, more complete negation strategies, such as delaying negation [22,38], and it 
may appear that we could do so with a simple modification of the semantics given 
here. Unfortunately, this appears not to be the case; only a simple variant, in which 
floundering closures are discarded and new closures allowed to succeed or fail, seems 
easily characterizable. 
For instance, it may appear that we can characterize delaying negation by modifying 
the function u so that v(B&C) = u(C &B) if v(B) = N and u(C) # N. This would 
appear to allow us to characterize a system which delays any subgoal G which has 
uninstantiated variables until the variables in G are instantiated, if ever. However, 
this semantics does not seem to correspond to the natural operational semantics. For 
instance, the query ZLxElyG, where G is ((x = 2&7(y = 3))&(x = 3 &loop())), 
would seem to fail in a natural delaying-negation system. u(Zlxx3yG) would be F only 
if all instances G8 of G were such that u(G0) = F; but in fact this is not the case with 
the new u. Under the substitution 6 = [x := 3, y := k], where k is a special constant, 
the new o assigns N to the left conjunct; thus GB is given the same truth value as 
(3 = 3&Zoop())&(3 = 2&l(k = 3)), namely U. It is not clear whether there is a u 
that will correctly characterize the natural behaviour, and it is not clear if there is an 
operational semantics which this v characterizes. 
Of course, the operational semantics in this paper takes a somewhat hard line on 
floundering; if the right-hand disjunct of a disjunction flounders, so does the whole 
disjunction, as suggested by the rules Vl and ~2. We could instead slightly liberalize 
the semantics by allowing the right-hand disjunct to return its result if the left-hand 
disjunct flounders: 
Vl : 
(0 : B,a) + c 
(8:BvC,cc)+o v2: 
(0 : B,tx) + o(0 : C,tx) + g’ 
(Q:BvC,ol)+a’ 
where 0 is T or U where o is N or F 
This operational semantics would cause floundering to behave as just another kind of 
failure. It should be characterizable by simply modifying u so that o(B V C) = u(B) 
if o(B) E {T, U} and v(B V C) = u(C) otherwise. The operational semantics presented 
in the main body of this paper was used only because it seemed to embody the 
straightforward notion of floundering as a run-time error. 
5.4. Absence-of-definition asfailure 
The approach to failure used in the operational semantics here is only one of several 
that could be taken. I have commented above on the idea of considering floundering 
to be a kind of failure; the absence of a definition for a predicate could also be taken 
as a kind of failure. 
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If we were to try to model this view of failure in the semantics, we would have to 
make some modifications. Here is one approach to modifying the semantics; others are 
possible. First, we would modify the operational semantics so that absence of definition 
is considered as failure (resulting in the F truth value). Second, we would modify 
the definition of predicate unfolding with respect to a program so that an undefined 
predicate call is “unfolded” into false. Third, we would have a second operational 
semantics which considers all predicate definitions to be undefined (resulting in truth 
value U). Finally, all results phrased in terms of the empty program would have to be 
phrased in terms of the second operational semantics. 
These modifications would somewhat weaken the homogeneity of the semantic struc- 
ture. They are also not entirely necessary if our only goal is to model the behaviour of 
a Prolog system; many Prolog systems consider lack of definition to be a compile-time 
or run-time error, to be dealt with outside the execution model per se. 
6. Comparison to previous work 
Here I discuss the relationship of the semantics in this paper to previous work. The 
most relevant previous work to consider is in the areas of semantics of depth-first 
Prolog, semantics of negation, and unfolding semantics. 
6.1. Depth-jirst prolog 
6.1.1. Metatheoretical and denotational approaches 
Setting aside presentations of operational semantics of depth-first Prolog [35,46,25, 
18,24,17,29,1,12,36] most of the previous attempts to characterize depth-first Prolog 
have been metatheoretic or denotational. 
Francez et al. [27] build proof systems which reason about computations, and Barbuti 
et al. [ 131 build a transformational semantics relying on the encoding of the termination 
theory of a program. While these semantics have their good points (in particular, the 
Barbuti et al. paper models a wide range of control strategies), there is also a great deal 
of metatheoretic encoding going on in them. For instance, the unification algorithm, 
which is more properly a part of the operational semantics, is encoded and represented 
in the high-level semantics. 
Many writers [3 1, 1 1,23,24,40,14] have constructed denotational semantics for 
depth-fist Prolog. These attempts make valuable connections between logic program- 
ming semantics (even accounting for unsound negation) and general programming lan- 
guage semantics. But it is somewhat disappointing that denotations of logic programs 
are given as functions from inputs to outputs, when a major point of the logic pro- 
gramming paradigm is that programs do not have to be viewed in this way. 
6.1.2. Logical approaches 
In contrast to the metatheoretic and denotational approaches, the declarative seman- 
tics in this paper is built from three logical basic elements: 
134 J. Andrewsl Theoretical Computer Science 184 (1997) 105-143 
l A valuation function u which formalizes our intuitive notions of Clark equality, 
left-to-right conjunction and disjunction, and insist-on-ground negation, and which 
gives a semantics for free variables via the Tarskian “witness” interpretation of the 
existential quantifier; 
l A congruence %dU which formalizes some intuitively clear logical and operational 
equivalences between goals; and 
l A class of congruences NP which formalizes our intuitive notion of predicate defi- 
nition. 
The technical results of soundness and completeness depend on the exact way in which 
these elements are defined and made to interact; the appeal of the semantics, like those 
of Fitting [26] and Kunen [33], lies in the logicalness of the elements. 
Other researchers have also explored logical approaches to the semantics of depth- 
first logic programming. The work of Phimer [42,43], Bronsard et al. [19], Bezem 
[16], and Apt et al. [7-91 deals with termination in Prolog programs. However, there 
is an important distinction to be made here. These researchers are working with the 
notion of strong or universal termination. A query is said to strongly terminate if all 
branches of its SLD-tree are finite; that is, if it either succeeds returning a finite number 
of solutions and then stopping, or else fails. If we consider only strong termination, 
we do not need to consider the left-to-right search strategy of Prolog, since a query 
strongly terminates iff it does so with respect to any search strategy. The notion of 
termination considered here is more general, in the sense that we consider a query 
to terminate successfully if it returns at least one solution. We can recapture strong 
termination by noting that a query G strongly terminates iff the query (G & false) fails. 
Note also that these researchers are taking variable modes into consideration in their 
work, thus going beyond the scope of this paper. They are also exploring practical 
methods for proving termination, which I have not attempted to touch on. 
Recently, Stark [44] has published a semantics for depth-first Prolog with negation 
which covers some of the same ground as [5]. Stark’s method is to translate a Prolog 
program into a new program in which each predicate is translated into three predicates: 
one corresponding to success, one corresponding to failure, and one corresponding 
to left-termination of the original predicate. However, Stark avoids the problem of 
characterizing floundering on negation by insisting that programs meet a mode criterion 
which guarantees that no queries flounder. The semantics of this paper is more general 
in the sense that even programs which do not meet this mode criterion and return 
non-floundering results can be characterized. 
6.2. Negation 
The corpus of literature on semantics of negation is massive, and I will not try 
to summarize it here; an excellent overview is given by Harland [30]. Briefly, the 
semantics given here differs from previous work in: 
l not restricting the form of programs, as opposed to the stratified and locally stratified 
schemes, and related approaches; 
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l assuming the top-down processing which is common in practice, as opposed to 
the bottom-up processing assumed by the perfect, stable, well-founded or tight [47] 
semantics; and in 
l considering the depth-first processing of queries which is common in practice, as 
opposed to most approaches. 
It also varies in style from most approaches by adopting the congruential framework 
rather than treating programs as collections of formulas in a least-model- or fixpoint- 
like framework. 
Naturally, the issue of using top-down and depth-first processing is irrelevant if we 
set aside the issue of completeness of the operational semantics, as for instance Fitting 
[26] and Kunen [33] do. But one of the main goals of this paper has been to give 
a logical and operational semantics which are sound and complete with respect to each 
other. 
6.3. Unfolding semantics 
I have already noted the similarity between this work and that of Levi’s group 
on unfolding semantics ([34,28] and many other papers). Whereas Levi et al. un- 
fold a program in order to find all the atoms entailed by it, the approach of this 
paper takes the positive Clark completion of the program and unfolds a goal in 
order to characterize its truth value. Both lines of work have a basis in Tamaki 
and Sato’s notion of unfolding of a logic program [45], which in turn is based 
on Burstall and Darlington’s corresponding technique from functional pro- 
gramming [20]. 
In general, the benefit of the unfolding technique is the same: it factors out the 
problem of predicate expansion, allowing us to characterize the behaviour of recur- 
sive programs in terms of non-recursive programs. We thus avoid the problem of 
the Clark-Andreka-Nemeti anomaly (as pointed out earlier), and achieve a symmetric 
characterization of success and failure. 
7. Conclusions and future directions 
I have presented here a sound and complete semantics for depth-first Prolog with 
a weak but logically sound form of negation. The major elements of the semantics 
are valuations (functions from goals to truth values) and congruences (syntactically 
compositional equivalence relations). Since both the valuations and the congruences 
are logically motivated, the semantics has a highly logical flavour. 
The techniques used in this paper are intriguing, and may be able to be applied 
to other commonly-used features of practical Prologs. Examples include other mode- 
dependent features such as predicate variables, var and nonvar, and dynamic type 
checking. An extension of the unfolding techniques used here may also result in 
a semantics for negation within extensions of Prolog such as hereditary Harrop 
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formulas [37]. I have recently extended the work in this paper to take account of 
the Prolog “cut”; a preliminary version of this work appears in [6]. 
In addition, other forms of negation within logic programming might be amenable 
to similar analysis. I am presently looking at negation in nondeterministic semantics, 
IC-Prolog-style negation, and (with Veronica Dahl) delaying negation. 
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Appendix A. Proofs of technical lemmas 
This appendix contains the proofs of the four technical lemmas stated in Section 4.1. 
Lemma A.1 (Substitution lemma). Let (0: ~1) 3 a. Then for every 0’ such that 
x0 = xtY for every free variable x of a, (6’ : a) 3 a. 
Proof. By induction on the size of the computation. Cases are on the last rule used 
in the computation. All cases follow directly from the induction hypothesis except the 
following: 
l Case 3: c( is of the form (3xB, a’). Let x’ not appear in either B, a, or 8’. Then (0 : 
B[x := x’],cl’) =+ a. Now 0’ agrees with 8 on all the free variables of B[x := ~‘],a; 
by the induction hypothesis, therefore, (0’ : B[x := x’], ~4) + a and (0’ : 3xB, tl’) F?- 
a. 
l Case =l: s0 is identical to SW and to is identical to to’, so the set of mgu’s of the 
two pairs of terms are identical. The result follows from the induction hypothesis. 
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l Case =2: SO is identical to se’ and t9 is identical to to’, so neither pair has an mgu. 
l Case ~3: 8 and 9’ agree on the free variables (if any) of B, so both queries 
return N. 0 
Lemma A.2 (Existential lemma). Let tl be a sequence of negated-disjunction (N) 
formulas, such that (0 : a) 3 CS. Let V be a subset of the free variables of c& 
Dejine a substitution p as acceptable if p does not assign a value to any variable 
not in V, but tip grounds all variables in V. DeJne a’(p) as the function such that 
(6~ : a) 3 a’(p). Then 
EXl . For some acceptable p, a’(p) = a. 
EX2. Zf a = T, then for all acceptable p, a’(p) E {T, U, F}. 
EX3. If a = U, then for all acceptable p, a’(p) E {U,F}. 
EX4. Zf a = F, then for all acceptable p, a’(p) = F. 
Proof. (EXl) Let V be as stated. The proof is by induction on the complexity (number 
of connectives and = symbols) of a. Cases are on the last rule used in the computation 
of a. 
l Case & : Schematically, we have 
(b) (0 : B,C,a) + a 5 (8~ : B, C, a) =+ a’(p) (c) 
(a) (O:B&C,a)=+a (Bp : B & C,a) + a’(p) (d) 
(a) and (b) are true by assumption. By the induction hypothesis, for some acceptable 
p, a’(p) = a; that is, (c) is true. (d) follows from (c) by one & step. 
l Case 3: Schematically, we have 
(b) (0 : B[x := ~‘],a) + a rr! (Bp : B[x := x’],cI) + a’(p) (c) 
(a) (0 : 3xB,a) + a (8~ : 3xB, CY) =+ a’(p) (4 
(a) and (b) are true by assumption. By the induction hypothesis (since V is also a 
subset of the free variables in (b)), for some acceptable p, a’(p) = a; that is, (c) is 
true. (d) follows from (c) by one 3 step, since p does not assign a value to x’. 
l Cases Vl, V2: these cases cannot occur with negated-disjunction (N) formulas. 
l Case =l: Schematically, we have 
(b) (00’ : 01) + a 5 (Wp’ : a) * a (c) 
(a) (O:s=t,cr)+a (Bp:s=t,x)+a (d) 
(a) and (b) are true by assumption; but by the induction hypothesis, there is some 
acceptable p’ such that (c) is true. But since 8’ is a unifier of SO and to, 8’~’ must 
also be. Define p to be the specialization of 0’~ to the variables of V. Then because 
of the properties of mgu, (d) follows from (c) in one =l step. 
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l Case =2: a = F, and because se and to do not unify, every substitution p is such 
that sep and top do not unify either. Thus, for all p, a’(p) = F. 
l Case pl: This case cannot occur with respect to the empty program. 
l Case p2: The predicate call will return U no matter what the substitution in the 
closure is; so all p are such that a’(p) = U. The result follows straightforwardly 
from the induction hypothesis. 
0 Case 7 1: No p can change the course of the computation of B because Be contains 
no free variables. Therefore a’(p) = F for all p. Note that in this and the other 1 
cases, the induction hypothesis does not need to be invoked on B (which might not 
be a negated-disjunction formula). 
0 Case 72: Be contains no free variables, so no p can affect the course of its com- 
putations. Schematically, therefore, we have 
(b) . . . (e : ~1) + a 5 . . . (ep : a> * a’(p) (c) 
(a) (0 : TB,a) + a (Q : +,4 + a’(p) (4 
(a) and (b) are true by assumption. By the induction hypothesis, there is an acceptable 
p such that (c) is true, with a’(p) = a. 
l Case ~3: For every free variable in Be which is a member of V, we can substitute 
a special constant not found in B and the effect will be the same. 
l Case 74: Since Be contains no free variables, no p can affect its computation. 
Therefore a’(p) = a for all p. 
l Case E. Clearly, a = T and a’(p) = T for any p. 
(EX2-4) Let V be as stated, and let p be acceptable. The proof is by induction on 
the complexity (number of connectives and = symbols) of a. Cases are on the last 
rule used in the computation of a. 
l Case &: Schematically, we have 
(b) (0 : B,C,a) + a 2 (8p : B,C,a) + a’(p) (c) 
(a) (0 : B & Ccc) + a (Bp : B & C,a) + a’(p) (d) 
(a) and (b) are true by assumption. (EX2). By the induction hypothesis, (Bp : B,C,or) 
=+ a’, where a’ E {T, U,F}; that is, (c) is true. (d) follows from (c) by one & step. 
(EX3-4). Similar to (EX2). 
l Case 3: Schematically, we have 
(b) (0 : B[x := x’],c() + a 2 (BP : B[x := x’],cI) + a’(p) (c) 
(a) (0 : 3xB,ol) + a (Bp : ~xB,u) + a’(p) (d) 
(a) and (b) are true by assumption. (EX2). By the induction hypothesis (since V is 
also a subset of the free variables in (b)), we have (Bp : B[x := ~‘],a) + a’ with 
a E {T, U,F}; that is, (c) is true. (d) follows from (c) by one 3 step. (EX34). Similar 
to (EX2). 
l Cases Vl, V2: These cases cannot occur with negated-disjunction (N) formulas. 
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Case =l, part (EX2). Let us consider the computation (Op : s = t,a) + a’(p). We 
have one of the following two situations. 
The last step in this computation is =2, and o’(p) is F. Clearly a’(p) E {T, U, F}. 
The last step is =l, and has the form 
(8pO” : a) =+ a’(p) 
(Bp : s = t, a) =+ a’(p) 
But the last step of the computation of (0 : s = t, a) has the form 
(ee’ : @) + g 
(e : s = t,‘!x) =+ fJ 
Since ptY’ unifies se and ttl, and 0’ is an mgu of se and tl9, there must be (by the 
properties of mgu) a p’ such that 6M’p’ E ptl”. This p’ is acceptable because it need 
only assign values to the variables in V. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis part 
(EX2), O’(P) E {T, VF}. 
Case =l, parts (EX3-4). Similar to =l, part (EX2). 
Case =2: CJ = F, so we need only prove (EX4). Because se and t6’ do not unify, 
every substitution p is such that sop and top do not unify either. Thus, for all p, 
a’(p) = F. 
Case pl: This case cannot occur with respect to the empty program. 
Case p2: cr = U, so we need only prove (EX3). The predicate call will return U 
no matter what the substitution in the closure is; so all p are such that a’(p) = U. 
The result follows straightforwardly from the induction hypothesis. 
Case -1: 0 = F, so we need only prove (EX4). No p can change the course of 
the computation of B because Bf? contains no free variables. Therefore, o’(p) = F 
for all p. (Note that in this and the other 1 cases, the induction hypothesis does not 
need to be invoked on B, which might not be a negated-disjunction formula.) 
Case 72: Be contains no free variable, so no p can affect the course of its compu- 
tations. Schematically, therefore, we have 
(b) . . . (e : a) + o 2 . . . (ep : N) + d(p) (c) 
(a) (0 : -B,cx) =+ B (@P : +,a) * a’(P) (d) 
(a) and (b) are true by assumption. (EX2). By the induction hypothesis, (c) is true, 
and a’(p) E {T, U, F}. (d) follows from (c) with one 72 step. (EX3) and (EX4): 
Similar to (EX2). 
a Case 73: r~ = N, so this case cannot occur with the assumptions of (EX2)-(EX4). 
l Case 74: Assuming 0 # N as per (EX2)-(EX4), we must have (T = U; that is, 
we only need prove (EX3). Since Be contains no free variables, no p can affect its 
computation. Therefore a’(p) = r~ for all p, and (EX2)-(EX4) hold. 
l Case E: g = T, so we need only prove (EX2); but clearly a’(p) = T for any p. 0 
Lemma A.3 (Conjunction, Left Success). Let cd be a sequence of negated-disjunction 
(N) formulas, such that (0 : a’) 8 T. Then ((3 : d, TV) =$ (T lff there is some 0’ such 
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that 
(1) At the top right corner of the derivation of (0 : a’) is the judgement (0’ : E) 3 
T; and 
(2) (e’ : a)% C. 
Proof. By induction on the complexity of IX. Cases are on the last rule applied in the 
computation of (e : a’). 
l Case & : cd is B & C, d’. Schematically, we have 
(cl (ef : E) * T (et : a) + G (4 
. . . . . . . . . . 
(b) (0 : B,C,ct”) + T (0 : B,c,d’,~) + u (e) 
(a) (0 : B & C,d’) + T (e:B&C,a”,a)+o (f) 
(+) We assume (a) and (f) from the theorem statement. (b) and (e) clearly follow. 
By the induction hypothesis on (b) and (e), (c) and (d) are true. 
(c) We assume (a), (c), and (d) from the theorem statement. (b) follows from (a). 
By the induction hypothesis on (b), (c), and (d), (e) is true; (f) follows from (e). 
0 Cases 3, = 1: similar to & . 
b Cases =2, pl, p2, 7 1, 7 3, and 74: these cannot be the last rule applied in the 
computation of (0 : a’), because that computation is supposed to result in T. 
l Case 72: CI’ is TB, d’. Schematically, we have 
Cc) (el : E) =s- T Cd) 
(b) (0 : B) + F ce : cd’) + T 
(a) (0 : ~B,cc”) + T 
;e : B) + F ;e : CI”,C() + (T (e) 
(e : ~B,a”,a) * CJ (f) 
(4) We assume (a) and (f) from the theorem statement; lines (b) and (e) follow. By 
the induction hypothesis on lines (b) and (e), (c) and (d) are true. (t) We assume (a), 
(c) and (d) from the theorem statement; line (b) follows from (a). By the induction 
hypothesis on (b), (c), and (d), line (e) is true; (f) follows from line (e). 
l Case E: LX’ is empty, and the result holds trivially. 0 
Lemma A.4 (Conjunction, Left Non-Success) If (0 : a’) 3 (T, where 0 # T, then for 
all CI, (e : CC’, a) 3 6. 
Proof. By induction on the sum of the complexities of all the formulas in CI’. Cases 
are on the last rule applied in the computation. We will do case & and case V2; the 
other cases are very similar. 
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l Case & : The last step is of the form 
(0 : B,C,d’) =s- o 
(0 : B & C,d’) + Q 
By the induction hypothesis, (0 : B, C, cl’, a) + a; but then we have the computation 
(0: B,C,cP,a) + 0 
(0 : B & C,d’,a) + o 
l Case ~2: the last step is of the form 
(0 : B,a”) =+ F (0 : C,a”) =+ CT 
(0 : B v C,ct”) =+ o 
By the induction hypothesis on the left premiss, (0 : B, a”, LY’) + F; and by the 
induction hypothesis on the right premiss, (0 : C, a”, ct’) + G. But then we have the 
computation 
(0 : B, cd’, a’) + F (0 : C, cc”, a’) =s. CT 
(0 : BV C,tl”,a’) =+- Q ’ 
0 
References 
[l] J.H. Andrews, The logical structure of sequential Prolog, in: Proc. 1990 North American Conf on 
Logic Programming, Austin, Texas (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990) 585-602. 
[2] J.H. Andrews, Logic Programming: Operational Semantics and Proof Theory, Distinguished 
Dissertation Series (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1991). 
[3] J.H. Andrews, Kernel/congruence semantics: a homogeneous treatment of some asymmetry problems in 
the model theory of logic programming, Tech. Report 92-12, Centre for Systems Science, Simon Fraser 
University, Bumaby, BC, Canada, 1992. 
[4] J.H. Andrews, A logical semantics for depth-first Prolog with ground negation, Tech. Report 93-10, 
Centre for Systems Science, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada, 1993. 
[S] J.H. Andrews, A logical semantics for depth-first Prolog with ground negation, in: Proc. Internat. Logic 
Programming Symp., Vancouver (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993). 
[6] J.H. Andrews, A paralogical semantics for the prolog cut, in: Proc. Znternat. Logic Programming 
Symp., Portland (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995). 
[7] K.R. Apt, R.N. Bol and J.W. Klop, Gn the safe termination of Prolog programs, in: Proc. Sixth 
Internat. Co@ on Logic Programming, Lisbon (1989) 353-368. 
[S] K.R. Apt and E. Marchiori, Reasoning about prolog programs: from modes through types to assertions, 
Formal Aspects Comput. 6A (1995) 743-764. 
[9] K. Apt and D. Pedreschi, Proving termination of general Prolog programs, Inform. Comput. 106 (1993) 
109-157. 
[lo] K.R. Apt and M.H. van Emden, Contributions to the theory of logic programming, J. Assoc. Comput. 
Machinery 29 (1982) 841-862. 
[ 1 I] B. Arbab and D.M. Berry, Operational and denotational semantics of Prolog, J. Logic Programming 4 
(1987) 309-329. 
[12] E. Babb, An incremental pure logic language with constraints and classical negation, in: T. Dodd, 
R. Owens and S. Torrance, eds., Logic Programming: Expanding the Horizons (Oxford, 1991) 
14462. 
[13] R. Barbuti, M. Codish, R. Giacobazzi and G. Levi, Modelling Prolog control, J. Logic Comput. 3 
(1993) 579-603. 
[14] M. Baudinet, Proving termination properties of Prolog programs: a semantic approach, J. Logic 
Programming 14 (1992). 
142 J. Andrewsl Theoretical Computer Science 184 (1997) 105-143 
[15] N.D. Belnap, Jr., A useful four-valued logic, in: J.M. Dunn and G. Epstein, eds., Modern Uses of 
Multiple- Valued Logic (Reidel, Dordrecht, 1975). 
[16] M. Bezem, Strong termination of logic programs, J. Logic Programming 15 (1993) 79-97. 
[17] M. Billaud, Simple operational and denotational semantics for Prolog with cut, Theoret. Comput. Sci 
71 (1990) 193-208. 
[ 181 E. Borger, A logical operational semantics of full Prolog, Technical Report IWBS Report 111, IBM 
Wissenschaftliches Zentrum, Institut liir Wissensbasierte Systeme, Heidelberg, Germany, 1990. 
[19] F. Bronsard, T.K. Lakshman and U. Reddy, A framework of directionality for proving termination of 
logic programs, in: Proc. Joint Zmernat. Conf Symp on Logic Programming, Washington, D.C. (MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992) 321-335. 
[20] R.M. Burstall and J. Darlington, A transformation system for developing recursive programs, 
J. ACM 24 (1977) 44-67. 
[21] K.L. Clark, Negation as failure, in: Logic and Data Bases (Plenum Press, New York, 1978) 293-322. 
[22] V. Dahl, Two solutions for the negation problem, in: Workshop on Logic Programming, Debrecen, 
Hungary, 1980. 
[23] S. Debray and P. Mishra, Denotational and operational semantics of Prolog, J. Logic Programming 5 
(1988) 61-91. 
[24] A. de Bruin and E.P. de Vi& Continuation semantics for Prolog with cut, in: Theory and Practice of 
Software Engineering, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 351 (Springer, Berlin, 1989) 178- 192. 
[25] P. Deransart and G. Ferrand, An operational formal definition of Prolog, Tech. Report RR763, INRIA, 
1987. 
[26] M. Fitting, A Kripke-Kleene semantics for logic programs, J. Logic Programming 4 (1985) 295-312. 
[27] N. Francez, 0. Grumberg, S. Katz and A. Pnueli, Proving termination of Prolog programs, in: 
R. Parikh, ed., Logics of Programs, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 193 (Springer, Berlin, 
1985) 89-105. 
[28] M. Gabbrieli and G. Levi, Unfolding and fixpoint semantics of concurrent constraint logic programs, 
Theoret. Comput. Sci. 105 (1992) 85-128. 
[29] S. Haridi, A logic programming language based on the Andorra model, New Generation Comput. 7 
(1990) 109-125. 
[30] J. Harland, Towards a static proof system for negation as failure, Technical Report 92/10, University 
of Melbourne, School of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering, 1992. 
[31] N.D. Jones and A. Mycrofi, Stepwise development of operational and denotational semantics for Prolog, 
in: Proc. 1984 Znternat. Symp. on Logic Programming (1984). 
[32] S. Kripke, Outline of a theory of truth, J. Philos. 72 (1975) 690-716. 
[33] K. Kunen, Negation in logic programming, J. Logic Programming 4 (1987) 298-308. 
[34] G. Levi, Models, unfolding rules and fixpoint semantics, in: Proc. 1988 Znternat. Conf and Symp. on 
Logic Programming, Seattle, Washington (1988) 1649- 1665. 
[35] J.W. Lloyd, Foundations of Logic Programming (Springer, Berlin, 1984). 
[36] P. McBrien, Implementing logic languages by graph rewriting, in: T. Dodd, R. Owens and 
S. Torrance, eds., Logic Programming: Expanding the Horizons (Intellect, Oxford, 1991), 
164-188. 
[37] D. Miller, G. Nadathur, F. Pfenning and A. Scedrov, Uniform proofs as a foundation for logic 
programming, Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 51 (1991) 125-157. 
[38] L. Naish, MU-Prolog 3.1 db Reference Manual, University of Melbourne, 1984. 
[39] L. Naish, Negation and Control in Prolog, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 238 (Springer, 
Berlin, 1986). 
[40] T. Nicholson and N. Foo, A denotational semantics for Prolog, ACM Trans. on Programming 
Languages and Systems 11 (1989) 650-665. 
[41] G. Plotkin, A structural approach to operational semantics, Tech. Report DAIMI FN-19, Computer 
Science Department, Aarhus University, Aarhus, 1981. 
[42] L. Pliimer, Termination Proofs for Logic Programs, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, 
Vol. 446 (Springer, Verlag, Berlin, 1990). 
[43] L. Pliimer, Termination proofs for logic programs based on predicate inequalities, in: Proc. 1990 
Znternat. Conf on Logic Programming, Jerusalem (1990) 634-648. 
[44] R. Stark, The declarative semantics of the Prolog selection rule, in: Proc. 9th Ann. IEEE Symp. on 
Logic in Computer Science, Paris (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994). 
J. Andrewsl Theoretical Computer Science I84 (1997) 105-143 143 
[45] H. Tamaki and T. Sato, Unfold/fold transformations of logic programs, in: Proc. 2nd Internat. Logic 
Programming Corzf Uppsala, Sweden (1984) 127-138. 
[46] P.J. Voda, A view of programming languages as symbiosis of meaning and computations, New 
Generation Comput. 3 (1985) 71-100. 
[47] M. Wallace, Tight, consistent, and computable completions for unrestricted logic programs, 
J. Logic Programming 15 (1993) 243-273. 
